How do public opinion signals affect political representatives' opinion formation? To date, we have only limited knowledge about this essential representative process. In this article, we theorize and examine the signaling strength of one type of societal signal: protest. We do so by means of an innovative experiment conducted among Belgian national and regional politicians. Elected officials were exposed to manipulated television news items covering a protest demonstration. Following Tilly's previously untested WUNC claim, four features of the event were manipulated: the demonstrators' worthiness, unity, numerical strength, and commitment. We argue that these protest features present elected officials with useful cues about what (a segment of ) the public wants. We find that these cues affect elected officials' beliefs. The salience they attach to the protest issue, the position they take, and their intended actions all change as a consequence of exposure. The size of a protest event (numbers) and whether the protesters agree among themselves (unity) are the most persuasive protest factors. The effects of the protest signals come on top of strong receiver effects. We find no evidence that elected officials' predispositions moderate the effects of the protest features.
In a democracy, elected representatives are supposed to represent society. In the words of Dahl (1973:1) , "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens." Because elected officials aim to remain in office and fear electoral sanctions, they have an interest in keeping close track of what the public wants and are expected to adjust their beliefs and actions accordingly (Downs 1957; Miller and Stokes 1963) . But how do elected representatives form perceptions about what the public, or a relevant segment of the public, wants? And, most importantly, to what extent are their own opinions affected by these perceptions?
To date, we have only limited knowledge about this essential representative process of individual opinion formation by elected officials (for a similar argument, see Belchior 2014; Broockman and Skovron 2013; Miler 2007) . To be sure, we do know that elected officials resort to different sources, like opinion polling (Geer 1996) , mass media (Herbst 1998) , contact with constituents (Fenno 1978) , and different forms of advocacy (Burstein 2014) to gauge what the public wants. And a large and growing body of research scrutinizes the actual correspondence between public opinion signals and policy behavior; that is, what elected officials do (Burstein 2014; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2004) . These studies find considerable evidence for a link between public opinion and policy. Yet this general pattern hides a great deal of variation in responsiveness as well. Policies tend to better reflect the preferences of the most affluent, for instance (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005) . Citizens with more money and political skill can better organize, have better access to policymakers, and manage to communicate their interests better and with more pressure (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012) . Similarly, public policy is biased toward the status quo, protecting the powers that be against the efforts of those who challenge extant policy (Gilens 2005) . Finally, democratic linkage is strongest for issues the general public cares most about (Burstein 2014; Wlezien 2004) . Politicians' leeway to cater to special interests is considerably larger for (the many) issues that stay under the public radar.
In summary, although we know that politicians resort to different sources to learn about public opinion, and although we have substantial evidence about democratic congruence and its contingencies, little is currently known about how individual elected officials process incoming public opinion signals and how these signals affect their own opinions.
To further our knowledge about how elected representatives form opinions-opinions that may later affect the actual policy initiatives they take or endorse-this study draws on an innovative experimental design and an exceptional set of respondents. We examine the process of opinion formation by elected representatives by presenting them with vignettes containing a story signaling the opinion of a segment of the public. The signals we confront them with are different media portrayals of a protest event. We test to what extent different versions of the signalin this case, carefully manipulated features of the protest action-differently affect the extent to which representatives align their own opinion with that of the protesters. Access to a large sample of national elected officials and the assets of experimentation give us unique leverage to address questions of how incoming societal signals affect representatives' opinion formation.
We consider protest as one particular public opinion signal that may influence elected representatives. Politicians, of course, are exposed to many other societal signals. Focusing on protest as an expression of a part of public opinion has distinct substantive, theoretical, and methodological advantages. Substantively, staging protest is the weapon of the weak. Protest groups typically are resource poor. They lack direct access to the policymaking process and often challenge (the lack of ) extant policies. These elements make responsiveness unlikely. By staging protest and going public, protesters seek social support, hoping to set in motion a process that will make it hard for elected officials to continue ignoring them. As such, studying the persuasiveness of protest signals is of particular substantive interest, as it can increase our understanding of the conditions under which a democracy can be more inclusive (or at least pluralistic). Focusing on protest as societal signals also has methodological and theoretical advantages. Protest signals are clearly delineated in terms of place, time, and issue and can thus be studied more easily than broader, more ambivalent signals. Additionally, we can build on a sizable body of existing theory about when protest matters (for a review, see Amenta et al. 2010; Andrews 2004; Biggs and Andrews 2015) .
More concretely, we theorize that who the protesters are, how they behave, and what they think determines the strength of the protest signal and affects the calculations elected officials make on whether and how to incorporate the protest signal in their own thinking (Gillion 2013; Lohmann 1993) . In particular, we test Tilly's (2004) widely cited but untested claim that protest influences power-holders when protesters display worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC). We conducted a survey-embedded vignette experiment with a large sample of elected politicians in Belgium. These representatives were exposed to manipulated television news items of a protest action regarding the asylum issue. Asylum is a heavily politicized issue worldwide. In Europe in particular, it has been high on both the public and political agenda since the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis. In our study, fielded well before the dramatic increase in refugees requesting asylum in Europe, the demonstrators criticized the Belgian asylum procedure, demanding a more humane process in due time based on clear regularization criteria. In the news item stimuli, the WUNCness of the asylum protest event varied systematically. After exposure, representatives were surveyed about their own opinion regarding the salience of the protest issue, their position on the protest issue, and the actions they intended to undertake regarding the protest issue.
Results show that politicians do react differently to different portrayals of protest. Elected representatives' own opinions regarding the protest issue and the extent to which they adopted the claims made by the protesters varied across manipulations of the protest signals. Displays of unity and the number of protestors involved were the most influential protest features shaping representatives' own issue salience, position, and intended action beliefs. Worthiness and commitment induced effects on position and salience, respectively. These signal effects came on top of elected officials' strong preexisting beliefs and opinions regarding the issue at stake. We conclude that the type of societal signal matters for representatives' opinion formation. Particular features of protest can push elected representatives' opinions to become more (or less) in line with the public opinion signals they are exposed to.
THe ImPoRTAnCe of eleCTeD RePReSenTATIveS' oPInIonS
Ultimately, the political outcome of any societal signal to power-holders depends on the perceptions, calculations, and subsequent actions of elected representatives (Jones, Boushey, and Workman 2006) . In the chain from signal to representation, the attitudes and beliefs of individual politicians matter for their political decision-making and for policies in general (Carnes 2013; Mansbridge 1999; Mondak 1995) . Also with regard to the impact of protest and social movements, the idea that individual politicians' opinions matter has gained ground (Burstein 1999; Luders 2006; Skrentny 2006) . In fact, the social movement literature holds that the presence of "elite allies" is an important, maybe even the single most important, factor of movement success (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Cress and Snow 2000; Soule and Olzak 2004) .
We argue that at least three aspects of elected representatives' opinions are relevant and may affect subsequent actions: (1) the salience representatives attribute to an issue; (2) the position they hold on the issue; and (3) their intention to undertake action regarding the issue. These three dimensions of elected officials' opinions can be considered conditions for their actual action to be in line with the expressed public opinion.
First, for a politician to act, she needs to care about the issue and find the problem important or salient. We know that attention is a scarce resource in politics (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) . Moreover, a considerable literature in political science shows that decision makers' attention is an absolute precondition for political change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005) . Politicians are bombarded with information and cannot attend to all incoming signals. A signal about public opinion thus needs to stand out to get noticed. If elected officials' perceptions of the importance or urgency of an issue is positively affected by a societal signal, the odds that they will actually intervene increase. This general logic also applies to protest signals. Protesters' primary aim, often, is to simply draw political attention to a problem (King, Bentele, and Soule 2007; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012) .
Second, for a politician's potential action to be in line with what the public wants, she needs to more or less substantively agree with the direction of public opinion expressed in the signal. In other words, the politician should hold a position that is in line with the definition of the problem put forward and see some merit in the solution encapsulated in the signal. A classic literature in political science describes the positioning of elected officials (going back to Downs 1957) and how political representatives' positions relate to those of their constituents (Miller and Stokes 1963) . This literature holds that constituents and representatives having similar positions increases the chance of adequate representation (Erikson et al. 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010) . Applied to protest signals, the more representatives agree or sympathize with a protest's demands, the higher the chance politicians will act in line with what the protesters want.
Third, finding an issue important and agreeing with the position of expressed public opinion is not enough-politicians must also intend to act on these beliefs. Politicians have a whole repertoire of different types of political action at their disposal. They can take a public stance, try to convince their fellow partisans to act, introduce a bill, ask a question in parliament, and so forth. All these actions are planned and carefully deliberated. Psychologists contend that people rarely act unless they intend to do so (Fishbein and Ajzen 2011). Thus, intended action is the third precondition for an individual politician to act in line with public opinion-in our case: acting according to a protest signal. Of course, there is a gap between what people say or intend to do and what they actually do (and this is certainly true for politicians!). But examining intended behavior is an often-used strategy when directly observing (or eliciting) behavior is impossible or ethically reprehensible.
In summary, elected politicians' opinions are important because they may foreshadow political action and actual policy. This makes the process of representatives' opinion formation central to representation.
HoW eleCTeD RePReSenTATIveS foRm oPInIonS
Political representatives are in the business of having opinions about societal matters. Politicians want to change society according to their values and principles; they aim to implement their plans for what they consider to be a better society (Strøm 1997) . So, politicians' opinions about issues are likely to be quite fixed and directly connected to their ideologies (Uslaner 1999) . Still, elected officials' opinions are not necessarily entirely stable. Their opinions can evolve in reaction to external stimuli, particularly signals about citizens' preferences, as neglecting these signals may endanger re-election.
According to democratic theory, political representatives' main motive is to secure reelection (Downs 1957). Even when representatives aim to develop policy, getting re-elected is the crucial precondition (Mayhew 1974) . As a consequence, politicians need to maximize votes, and to that end they need information about citizens' preferences (Erikson et al. 2002) . To stay in tune with the electorate and minimize the risk of being blamed at election time (McGraw 1990; Weaver 1986) , politicians pay attention to many informational cues, ranging from public opinion polls and research reports to media coverage about the issues of the day (Herbst 1998) . All these sources allow elected representatives to track public preferences. Note that representatives are not expected to weigh all segments of the public equally. They are expected to devote special attention to citizens living (and voting) in their electoral district, to voters supporting their party, to parts of the population they explicitly care about because of ideological reasons, or to segments of the public that have the resources to put them under pressure (e.g., by sponsoring their campaign, or not).
We argue that representatives' exposure to societal signals affects not only their perception of what the public wants but also their own opinion. Because political survival through public support in elections is a representative's main motive, it makes sense for them to let their own opinion be affected by their perception of what the public, or a relevant segment of the public, wants. Whether representatives are right in assuming that the public will punish them for acting non-responsively and will reward them for acting responsively does not really matter (Lang and Lang 2008) . As long as they think their behavior is visible and the public will react to it, they are likely to update their own preferences to bring them in line with what they think the people think. In other words, we expect political representatives, to some extent, to align their own opinion with the public opinion signal coming in from society.
The protest we examine in this study is just another public opinion signal politicians get from society. Protest actions provide representatives with specific bits and bytes of information that improve their understanding of what the public, or a specific segment of the public that they particularly care about, wants (Gillion 2013; Lohmann 1993) . The attractiveness of the information encapsulated in protest can best be understood when looking at representatives' information environment. In this environment, information is abundant and acquiring accurate information is costly and time intensive (Miler 2009; Simon 1962 ). In addition, the accuracy of the public opinion information representatives receive is often problematic. Public positions and priorities may be volatile (Zaller 1992) . Representatives' knowledge about what the public wants is thus always imperfect at best (Miller and Stokes 1963) . The uncertainty of the information environment is further amplified by the role of mass media, which operates according to its own logic (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999; Strömbäck 2008) . Mass media connects specialist publics with the general public, so information and debates presented in this forum can reach inattentive bystander publics, possibly turning these passive spectators into active stakeholders (Ferree et al. 2002) . According to Key's (1961) classic account of public opinion, it is the uncertainty about this activation of latent public opinion that causes most anxiety among political representatives. Arnold (1990) , similarly, argues that legislators constantly anticipate future public preferences and involvement when making decisions, estimating citizens' potential preferences and the electoral "bite" of an issue, out of fear of being held accountable at election time.
In this complex information environment, protest signals form a rare species of relatively succinct, clear, and manageable information. A protest signal yields cues about (1) how many people and (2) which people care about an issue, (3) to what extent they care, and what their exact (4) position on the issue is. Of course, protest signals are unclear to some degree, because it may be in protesters' interests to mislead political decision makers. As Burstein (1999) notes, groups who believe their views to be supported by a popular majority want politicians' perceptions to be accurate. In contrast, groups whose preferences are in the minority want their positions to be perceived as more popular than they actually are.
In any case, bringing an issue out in the open by means of protest can influence elected officials directly, by changing their perception of what the public wants (be it accurate or not), or indirectly, by setting in motion and activating public opinion itself, which in turn can put pressure on representatives, either in line with what the protestors want, or against their claims, by encouraging counter-movement mobilization (Burstein 1999; McAdam and Su 2002; Zaller 1992 Zaller , 1997 . All these pathways of potential impact come together in the mind of the ever-anticipating politician, affecting her calculations when she decides whether and, if so, how to incorporate the incoming information and align her own opinion with it.
Our account of protest events as informative signals is not entirely new (see Gillion 2012; Lohmann 1993; McAdam and Su 2002) , but our strong emphasis on the receiver side of the signal is. Previous work in social movement studies has considered protest actions as communicative acts (Etzioni 1970) , examined the importance of protest being projected and perceived (Lipsky 1968) , discussed the relevance of gaining (supportive) media attention (Koopmans 2004) , and investigated the related mechanism of scope enlargement (Gamson 2004) . All these accounts are implicitly based on the idea that protest forms a public opinion signal that may affect representatives' perception of public opinion, and subsequently, their own opinion.
WHAT mATTeRS In A PRoTeST SIgnAl?
What exactly in a protest triggers elected officials to update their beliefs about the protest issue? Where does the strength of a protest signal stem from? We argued that representatives are looking for cues about (1) how many people and (2) which people care about an issue, (3) to what extent they care, and (4) what their exact position on the issue is. In this section, we argue that specific features of a protest event may provide representatives with exactly these cues (for a similar argument, see Gillion 2013; McAdam 1996) . We expect these protest features lead representatives to update their opinions.
The most extensive claim of how protest includes public opinion signals that may affect observers was formulated by Tilly in a series of publications (1994, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010) . According to Tilly, political representatives are responsive to protests when protesters display worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC). Although Tilly's WUNC idea rarely took center stage in any of his work, we believe the framework has merit and use it as our point of departure. WUNC signals that protestors are credible (worthy), are a large group (numbers), agree among themselves about what they want (unity), and strongly care about the issue and will not give up easily (commitment). These four elements form an implicit scorecard against which observers assess demonstrators' strength. They nicely map onto the public opinion cues politicians are looking for. WUNC matters because it makes a powerful assertion of popular sovereignty (Tilly 2004:13) : the protesters are serious claimants, who legitimately speak on behalf of society, and who can use their strength to "enter, realign, or disrupt the existing polity" (Tilly 1999:262) . From the perspective of political representatives, high WUNC protests broadcast the existence of a potential voting block that might influence their chances of re-election (Tilly 2004) .
Note that Tilly talks about WUNC "displays" (Tilly 2004:4) and "broadcasting" WUNC (Tilly 1995:373) . WUNC is a performance, something protesters deliberately seek to portray. It is the result of "mystification" processes and more a matter of appearance than of reality (Tilly 1994:16) . Given that WUNC is a subjective construction by protesters seeking to persuade observers, the mass media arena emerges as the main stage on which contemporary movements seek to enact WUNC (Koopmans 2004) . Tilly (2008: 74) considers protest demonstrations in particular as vehicles to show off WUNC, because they are like "miniature social movements" and "nicely encapsulate the distinctive features of social movement displays" (Tilly 1999:260) .
Tilly never explicitly operationalized the four WUNC elements beyond exemplary descriptions (see, e.g., Tilly 2004 Tilly :4, 2006 nor connected the individual WUNC elements to related strands of research. We do this here and present our interpretation of Tilly's WUNC features.
Worthiness. Tilly's first feature of protest matches what Schneider and Ingram (2005) call the "deservingness" of the beneficiaries of public policy. By behaving in a worthy fashion, protesters signal to politicians that they are good citizens and that the protest's claim is supported by a segment of the public that deserves to get what it wants because it behaves in an appropriate manner. In other words, worthiness provides representatives with information about what kind of segment of the public the protest signal comes from.
Specifically, within the field of social movement studies, the worthiness feature can be related to the ongoing disruption-moderation debate (Giugni 1999) . According to Tilly, movements sacrifice the advantages of violent action and choose to behave non-violently to gain recognition as respectable players who should be listened to. Tilly hints at the non-violent nature of worthy protest by describing it as "eloquent" (Tilly 1994:13) , "disciplined" (Tilly 2008:144) , and not "disreputable" (Tilly 2006:291 ). Tilly's stance on non-violence is provocative because of a lack of empirical consensus. Early work on the impact of social movements by Gamson (1990) and especially Piven and Cloward (1993) emphasized the advantages of disruptive strategies. The mechanism behind responsiveness to unworthy protestor behavior is that officials "trade concessions for tranquility" (De Nardo 1985:35; McAdam 1983 ). An overview of protest impact studies by McAdam and Su (2002) , however, concludes that the relationship between disruption and policy outcomes is mixed or inconclusive at best. With the normalization of protest in Western democracies (Dalton 2008; Meyer and Tarrow 1998) , people have come to see peaceful protest as a legitimate way of making demands (Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005) , whereas the opposite has happened with regard to disruptive contention (della Porta and Diani 1999; Tarrow 1994) . Violent behavior is therefore likely to lead to marginalization and even criminalization of protestors, and it can alienate elected officials and potential sympathizers. In summary, we expect violent demonstrators to negatively influence elected officials' opinion of a protest issue, because the violence can influence officials' perceptions of protesters' worthiness.
Unity. Unity is a matter of message coherence and displaying this coherence by uniform gestures (applauding, chanting, walking together) and symbols (badges, colors, flags) (Tilly 2004) . Unified protesters should be more effective in persuading elected officials because of two reasons. First, unified protestors produce a clear signal, which is easier to interpret and follow up. Protests with multiple claims or whose protestors disagree, send ambiguous, messy signals; it is unclear what exact position they are defending and they leave politicians puzzled. Second, message coherence may be an indicator of organizational strength of the relevant segment of the public. Protestor unity can give politicians the impression of a wellorganized actor who can mobilize against them, or whom they can rely on and work with to strike a bargain.
Within the field of social movement studies, the relevance of unity can be traced back to theories of frame alignment (Benford and Snow 2000 ). Yet, most framing studies focus on mobilization, and only a few have tackled the effect of message coherence on political outcomes of protest. Gamson (1990) , in his seminal study, found single-issue groups were more successful than multi-issue groups. Cress and Snow (2000) , similarly, demonstrated the effectiveness of more articulate and coherent frames in their study on the mobilization of the homeless. More recently, Fassiotto and Soule (2015) , relying on a category-spanning framework (Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak 2009) , showed how women's protests with focused messages were more likely to raise congressional attention compared to protests sending more muddy signals. In summary, we expect clear, focused protest messages to increase representatives' responsiveness to a protest signal.
Numbers. Demonstration turnout as a source of protest strength is most directly related to theories of democratic representation. De Nardo (1985) and della Porta and Diani (1999) both hold that "power is in numbers." Numerical strength aligns with the majoritarian logic of representative democracy. Protest size gives elected politicians cues about the broader support demonstrators enjoy in society, and hence about the size of the segment of the public involved (Burstein and Linton 2002; Lohmann 1993) . The larger the protest the higher the chance that the majority of the public shares the protesters' views, causing representatives to cater to demands voiced by large demonstrations. Again, although the relationship between demonstration size and demonstration outcomes is plausible, few protest studies directly tackle this puzzle. McAdam and Su (2002) show how larger peace demonstrations increased the pace of congressional action during the Vietnam War. Walgrave and Vliegenthart (2012) find that especially large demonstrations move legislation across a wide range of issues. In summary, we expect elected officials' opinions to be susceptible to cues about protest size, with large demonstrations positively affecting elected officials' opinion formation.
Commitment. According to Tilly (1994) , demonstrators show commitment by persisting in costly activity and showing readiness to endure. Committed protestors convince elected representatives that the activity is not simply a fad but that dissatisfaction is deeply rooted. Because committed people pursue their goals at the expense of other potential activities and interests (Hunt and Benford 2004) , committed protestors will likely persist and vote accordingly. The prospect of continuous contention, which might raise the salience and electoral bite of an issue, may make politicians responsive to such "issue publics" (Popkin 1991) .
Agenda-setting studies of protest impact have measured commitment by means of demonstration frequency. Although some studies find no or limited evidence for the effect of protest frequency (Giugni 2007; Olzak and Soule 2009 ), other studies do find effects (Johnson, Agnone, and McCarthy 2010; King et al. 2007; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012) . Because displays of commitment by protesters encapsulate a strong cue about how much a part of the public really cares about the underlying issue, we expect elected representatives to update their opinions accordingly.
In summary, in line with Tilly, we expect all four WUNC features to yield positive effects on elected officials' opinion formation. Note, however, that our literature review also adds some relief to this general expectation. Whereas the impact of numbers can be considered obvious, given its match with the logic of representative democracy, extant literature is not on the same page about the effect of a feature like worthiness.
DATA AnD meTHoDS
We fielded a survey-embedded TV-vignette experiment among Belgian elected officials from March 2015 to May 2015, well before the outburst of the Syrian refugee crisis.
1 Vignette designs confront respondents with fictional descriptions of a situation. Several characteristics of this situation are systematically manipulated (independent variables) to tease out the extent to which these aspects play a role in forming judgments (dependent variable). For an overview of the use of vignette studies in sociology, see Wallander (2009) .
Procedure
The respondents (N = 269) for this study are all Dutch-or French-speaking elected national (42 percent) or regional (58 percent) politicians in Belgium. The target population consisted of all 370 Members of the Belgian national parliament, the Flemish regional parliament, and the Brussels-Wallonia regional parliament (251 MPs participated). This sampling frame was complemented by adding the party leaders of all parties sitting in one of these parliaments (six party leaders participated) and the ministers in the respective national and regional governments (12 ministers participated). In total, 65 percent of all contacted politicians participated in the study-a high response rate for a target group known to be notoriously pressed for time (for a study among MPs in 15 countries, with a response rate ranging between 12.9 and 43.3 percent, see Deschouwer and Depauw 2014). This high degree of cooperation might be due, in part, to Belgian exceptionalism, the consequence of a political culture in a small democracy where elected officials cooperate in academic research. Our way of approaching elected officials, in tandem with the subject of the broader study, also boosted the response rate. We contacted elected officials with an official letter that explained the purpose of the study (how politicians tame the information tide and how this influences their job as representatives), mentioned the funding agency, stressed why cooperation mattered, promised anonymity, and gave the option to receive a descriptive study report. The letter closed by stating that in the following week(s), the elected official would be contacted by telephone by the principal investigator of the project to answer all possible questions and to schedule a meeting of approximately one hour, consisting of a survey and an interview. Elected officials were re-contacted until an appointment was made or until they explicitly refused cooperation. Political representatives were surveyed by a team of trained and experienced researchers who visited them in their Brussels offices. Respondents completed the survey on a laptop provided by the interviewer.
The protest vignettes were shown at the end of the longer (35 minutes) survey that dealt more generally with elected officials' information-processing behavior. The survey started with questions tapping the sources of information the politicians attune to, questioned them about issues they considered important, and asked them to engage in a process-tracing exercise about their most important political initiative. We have no reason to believe that the broader set-up of the survey had any confounding effect on our results. Politicians were shown two fictional television news reports about a demonstration on the same topic. The TV news report lasted about one minute, was voiceover only, showed the logo of the public broadcaster, and dealt with the issue of asylum-seekers. Politicians were asked to watch both items attentively. After each item, they were given a number of questions tapping their beliefs about the protest issue and the protestors. Clips were grouped in sets of two, with each clip being the complete opposite of the other, making for a balanced design (Atzmüller and Steiner 2010) . Sets were randomly distributed across respondents, and the clip order within a set was randomized. Dutch and French clips were identical in terms of footage and voiceover, only voiceover language differed. The results of a manipulation check showed the news items were perceived as realistic and the manipulations came across as intended. Full details on the construction of the TV clip stimuli, exact question wording, randomization, the manipulation check, and basic descriptives can be found in the Appendix and the online supplement.
Independent Variables: Protest Features in TV News Vignettes
We investigate the influence of four protest features, the key independent variables of the study: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. We manipulated a fifth protest feature (diversity) when creating the vignettes, but given that diversity was not part of Tilly's original theory, the non-significant effect of the diversity manipulation, and space constraints, we do not report the diversity results here. Because of the randomized exposure and balanced design, this has no effect on the results.
All manipulated protest features could have two values (high or low), so we created 32 (2 5 ) different clips, each containing a unique combination of all five protest features (four of which we report here). The protest covered in the news item dealt with the Belgian asylum procedure. Asylum is an important and heavily politicized issue worldwide and particularly in Europe and Belgium. The realism of the topic and the setting in which the experiment was conducted ensured that elected officials engaged in an authentic way with the stimuli (see the following sections). The external validity of the experiment is further increased by the fact that asylumseekers frequently demonstrate in Brussels. One of the study authors collected police archive data on demonstration activity in Brussels showing that, between 2001 and 2010, at least 446 protest events were staged on the issue of asylum and migration. The same protest event analysis found that asylumseeker demonstrations in Belgium vary strongly on the WUNC elements: there are small and large events, violent and non-violent ones, and these demonstrations regularly make it to the television news (Wouters 2013) . This underscores the mundane realism of representatives being confronted with TV news about different asylum protests. The demonstrators' precise claim was featured in the introduction of the news items and kept identical across clips. 
Dependent Variables: Politicians' Opinions
Immediately after watching each clip, politicians were asked six questions regarding their personal beliefs and planned behavior with regard to the protest they had just watched. Politicians rated the following three statements on 0 to 10 scales (totally disagree to totally agree): "The demonstrators in this clip attracted my interest" (interest); "I sympathize with the demonstrators in this clip" (sympathy); and "I agree with the demonstrators in this clip" (agree). Representatives were also given the following three questions to be answered on 0 to 10 scales (definitely not to definitely yes): "Would you consider referring to this demonstration in an informal conversation with colleagues?" (conversation); "Would you consider taking a public stance as a result of this demonstration (tweet, opinion piece, interview,…)?" (stance); and "Would you consider taking formal political action as a result of this demonstration (for example, asking an oral or written question in parliament)?" (formal).
The six measures were designed to tap the salience, position, and intended action beliefs of the representatives, each belief being covered by two direct measures. Interest and conversation tap the salience belief (Cronbach's Alpha = .81), sympathy and agree the positional belief (Cronbach's Alpha = .87), and stance and formal relate to intended action (Cronbach's Alpha = .81). We use averaged indexes of these three pairs of two questions as the dependent variables of our study. All analyses reported here were carried out separately on all six measures; the results are identical to the ones we report.
Elected Officials' Pretreatment Attitudes
We questioned politicians' pretreatment attitudes about the asylum issue. We measured these attitudes at the beginning of the survey, about 25 minutes before respondents were exposed to the clips. These attitudes can be considered a measure of the degree to which the elected officials held beliefs congruent with the protest signal prior to their exposure to the protest. The question is whether features of the protest affect elected officials' opinion formation on top of their predispositions.
We measured politicians' pretreatment asylum attitudes using four questions (0 to 10 scale): "Immigrants must be able to preserve their own culture," "Belgium must close its borders to asylum-seekers," "Illegal immigrants must be expelled, even when they are integrated," and "Asylum-seekers with children should not be placed in detention centers." These four questions form a single asylum stance scale (Cronbach's Alpha = .69). Second, we expect left-wing party politicians to think systematically more positively about the protests; we thus include a leftparty dummy in our statistical models. Third, the regional affiliation of a politician may be relevant. Asylum and migration is a more important and contentious issue in the Dutchspeaking (Flanders) than in the French-speaking (Wallonia and Brussels) part of the country. Flanders has seen the rise of one of the Images of white participants as well.
strongest right-wing anti-immigration parties in Europe (Vlaams Belang), whereas Wallonia never had a successful anti-immigration party. Therefore, Flemish and Walloon politicians should think and act differently when it comes to asylum protest, with representatives from the Flemish region likely to be more skeptical about immigration in general and asylum-seekers' claims in particular. Finally, we expect politicians who specialize in asylum matters will consider the issue as more salient and will be more likely to consider acting on the protest signal. A dummy gauges whether a politician, when asked in the survey about her most important working issues, listed asylum/immigration as one of her three most important issues.
Controls
Our models take into account the viewing order of the clips (remember that clip order was randomized within sets). Salience and position scores vary systematically between the first and second clips, with politicians reporting lower salience and less congruent positions after the second clip. This might be a consequence of the reduced novelty of the second exposure. By controlling for clip order, we can gauge net effects of the variables of interest.
ReSulTS
Because the observations in our dataset are not independent, we present results in the form of random-intercept linear multilevel models. Each elected representative rated two TV clips; clips (level 1) are therefore the unit of analysis and are modeled as nested in politicians (level 2). Multilevel modeling reflects the hierarchical structure of our data, controls for intra-rater correlation (Rossi and Nock 1982) , is frequently used, and is considered the preferred strategy for analyzing vignette studies (Hox, Kreft, and Hermkens 1991; Wallander 2009 ). We used the xtmixed command in Stata to fit the models and the margins command to calculate predicted values. Table 2 shows results of three models assessing the effect of protest features on elected officials' beliefs-the extent to which they estimated the protest issue to be important (salience), the degree to which they substantially agreed with the protesters (position), and whether they intended to take action following up on the protest (action). The models control for elected representatives' pretreatment asylum beliefs and for aspects of the design (clip order).
It is no surprise to find that effects of elected officials' prior beliefs are substantial. What politicians think about immigration and asylum-seekers before exposure strongly determines their opinions. Due to their structural (region, party, specialization) and ideological (asylum stance and party) positions, elected officials' beliefs are already, to varying extents, congruent with the claim embedded in the protest signal, irrespective of who the protesters are and how they behave. All but two of the 12 coefficients tapping effects of elected representatives' predispositions in the three models point toward strong and significant effects. Politicians from left-wing parties and those holding generally positive asylum stances before being exposed to the clips tended to find the issue more important, agreed to a greater extent with the protest claim, and were more likely to consider undertaking action. A politician's specialization in asylum/immigration and belonging to the Dutch or French regional group also produced salience and action effects. Our results suggest that these predispositions matter a great deal.
We calculated predicted values based on the models in Table 2 for the most "extreme" elected representatives. A French-speaking politician from a left-wing party, who specialized in asylum and held pretreatment stances fully in favor of asylum-seekers, rated the protest as 9.37 on the 0 to 10 salience scale. The exact mirror image of this politician scored the protest merely at 2.99 on the same scale. We obtained similar results for position (8.59 versus 2.39) and action (9.54 versus 2.21) effects. The model diagnostics at the bottom of the table add weight to the conclusion that preexisting beliefs matter strongly for opinion formation in reaction to incoming societal signals. The variables at the politician level explain a good deal of the variance (29.2 percent, 48.3 percent, and 23.1 percent, respectively).
These findings indicate that congruence between public opinion signals and elected officials' opinions strongly depends on the ideology and structural position of the representative in question. Moreover, the fact that our first results match these rich "real world" observations about, for example, regional and party differences, suggests that the participating politicians experienced the experimental treatment as realistic and were properly engaged with the stimuli.
In summary, we find evidence of strong receiver effects; representatives' predispositions strongly matter. Do features of the protest signal exert an effect on top of these potent effects of politicians' features? In other words, can protesters-by who they are and how they behave-send cues to politicians that affect their opinions? Our results suggest they can. Figure 1 shows predicted values for all protest features based on the models in Table 2 . All other variables are kept at their mean; significant effects are marked with stars. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Whether demonstrators' behavior in the march is calm and serene or turns (mildly) violent produces a clear position effect. Demonstrators behaving in a worthy manner convinced representatives to agree or sympathize with their claim-the effect size is .4 on a 0 to 10 scale. Displays of worthiness create sympathy and goodwill. Worthiness does not bear any significant effect on salience or action. The sheer fact that we find an effect of worthiness on position is a solid finding; politicians' policy positions on issues are supposed to be stable because they are grounded in their party's official stance and in the ideology to which they publicly adhere, which we showed earlier to be the case. Moreover, we fully control for respondents' pretreatment position on the issue by a battery of questions incorporated in the model.
The crux of staging a protest that successfully affects elected officials' opinion formation is to come across as united and numerous. High numbers alter politicians' calculations and generate effects on all three relevant beliefs (salience, position, and action). Effect sizes are modest, again, and range from .3 (position) to .4 (action). That power is in numbers is a more or less established (but rarely explicitly empirically scrutinized) fact in social movement theory, and we see it confirmed here for the first time, as far as we know, in an experimental fashion controlling for possible confounding factors.
Unity is also effective for influencing elected officials' beliefs. The conditions with unified demonstrators received higher salience, position, and action ratings, with effect sizes of .27 for salience, .36 for position, and .35 for action. In the low unity condition, demonstrators were presented as having disparate claims, ranging from specific claims related to asylum-seekers to general claims about peace in Syria. Broadcasting messier, less coherent claims appears to be detrimental to the strength of the protest signal, even when the messy part of the claim refers to a position no elected official would disagree with (peace in Syria). If the impression exists that not all participants are on the same page, elected officials perceive protestor grievances as less salient, are less apt to agree with the demonstrators, and are less prepared to take action. Having a focused, coherent, and nonambivalent claim clearly matters. Moreover, because peace in Syria (the cue that introduced the low unity trait of the demonstration) is regarded as a consensus issue in Belgian politics, we can convincingly claim that the coherence of the message, not disagreement with the additional claim, causes the position effect.
Committed demonstrators, finally, add weight to the saliency beliefs of MPs, although the effect is only marginally significant ( p = .063). If we disaggregate the saliency scale in its two component variables-informally talking with colleagues and explicitly assessing the importance of the protest issue-and run separate models (not reported in the table or figure) , we see that commitment has a significant effect on informal talk ( p = .014) but not on direct salience ratings ( p = .397). So, our evidence produces a modest indication that demonstrators who manage to show that they are not likely to give up convince political representatives that they deserve attention. By displaying that their protest is here to stay, protestors succeed in being the subject of conversation among elected officials.
All told, features of a protest signal do matter for elected officials' opinion formation. A clear pattern emerges: whereas high unity and high numbers are consequential for all aspects of elected officials' beliefs, high worthiness results in position effects and commitment adds some (modest) weight to the perceived saliency of demonstrators' claims. The aggregate effect of all WUNC elements together is quite substantial. Protest that maximizes WUNC-high worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment-scores, on average, 6.4 on the position scale; protest that scores low on all factors comes out at 5.3. The effects for action (5.3 versus 4.2) are similar, and for salience they are a little smaller (6.1 versus 5.3). Moreover, the models in Table 2 indicate that some of the variance at the newsitem level is successfully explained by the manipulated protest features. This holds especially for the explained variance of the position model (21.4 percent explained variance at the clip level), and to a lesser extent for the salience (11.6 percent) and intended action (9.4 percent) models.
The comparison between features of the signal and the predispositions of elected officials puts the results further in perspective. Clearly, the WUNC effects we find are more modest compared to the sizable effects of elected officials' pretreatment beliefs and ideology. Who is at the receiving end of the protest signal obviously matters most: politicians are professional opinion-holders with crystallized arguments and strong worldviews. This holds for a sensitive and contentious issue such as asylum. Our pick of the asylum issue probably resulted in a conservative test: protests dealing with newer issues likely have more leeway in affecting elected officials' opinion formation. Yet, the mere fact that we find these protest effects while simultaneously controlling for the strong predispositions of elected officials adds to our expectation that politicians are indeed responsive to incoming societal signals, and that such signals can shape how elected officials think about political issues.
Our finding that both preexisting beliefs and protest features in the clips matter for post-exposure opinions raises the question of whether elected representatives are differently affected by protest features depending on their predispositions. We tested whether the protest feature effects are found across-theboard, or rather, whether they are moderated by representatives' predispositions. For each of the three outcome variables, we ran models interacting all four protest features with each of the four features of representatives (results reported in Part D of the online supplement). Of these 48 interaction coefficients (3 × 4 × 4) none were significant; no interaction coefficients passed the p = .05 significance threshold. In summary, we do not find evidence that elected officials' predispositions moderate the effects of protest features. Rather, it seems as if politicians, irrespective of their existing beliefs, assess and interpret these incoming cues similarly. The WUNC effects on politicians appear to be universal, as anticipated by Tilly. WUNC seems to mobilize the most basic democratic responsiveness among representatives; respondents were, for example, almost all affected by the larger size of a protest, probably simply because numbers are important in the calculations of any politician interested in re-election.
ConCluSIonS
What elected representatives think about issues is important. It affects what they undertake in the political arena and which initiatives they support. While we have some knowledge about where elected officials look for information about public opinion and how they form a perception of what the public wants, little to no work explores whether and how their own opinions about issues are influenced by these perceptions. We argued that clear and compelling signals of public opinion, or of a segment of public opinion that is relevant to a politician, can influence representatives' own opinions, because acting in line with what the public, or a specific segment of the public, wants is the most likely route to re-election (or so elected officials think). Politicians want to know how many people support a certain issue position, they look for cues about what these people want and who these people are, and they search for information on how much these people care about getting what they want. We held that the signal sent by protesting citizens may contain all these bits of information and may thus affect what representatives think about political issues.
More concretely, we drew on Tilly's influential but untested WUNC account to further theorize about what it is in societal signals that matters for representatives. The worthiness of protesters sends a signal about the type of people supporting a certain position, the unity they display elucidates the exact nature of this position, their numbers convey obvious information about the size of the public opinion segment supporting that position, and their commitment yields a cue of how salient the issue is to them.
We put this theory to the test drawing on an original experimental design. We gained access to large numbers of actual national and regional elected representatives and exposed this hard-to-reach but crucial group to manipulated television news items of a protest march dealing with the asylum issue. We found that who the protestors are and how they behave influences elected representatives' opinion formation. In particular, protests that mobilize demonstrators who agree among themselves, share a single claim, and bring many people to the streets impress elected officials. Unity and numbers significantly change representatives' opinions regarding the importance of the underlying issue. These cues even alter representatives' positions and make them willing to undertake action. When demonstrators appear worthy, elected officials' issue positions are updated. In addition, protesters revealing themselves as committed to the cause might affect the perceived importance of the issue.
These effects of the features of a protest signal come on top of strong and pervasive effects of elected officials' predispositions. What politicians think or believe before exposure to a societal signal strongly affects their opinion formation on that issue. This should come as no surprise: representatives are in the business of having opinions on societal matters, so their views should be crystallized and strong. Our findings show, however, that elected officials' opinions are not entirely stable. Elected officials do update their opinions in reaction to external stimuli; the opinions they hold are affected by features of signals coming in from society. Interestingly, our results show that elected officials' predispositions do not function as a filtering screen. We found no evidence that some elected officials are more responsive than others to some protest features. Rather, WUNC features similarly affected politicians from the left and the right, specialists and non-specialists, and those who held pro-asylum stances and those who did not. This finding hints that Tilly's WUNC framework, tapping into the idea of popular sovereignty as the origin of power in democracies, may indeed be universal and affect all politicians.
Substantively, our findings specify how protest might be an effective weapon of the weak. Having other means and better access, the resource rich do not need to rely on protest to communicate their preferences to decision makers. People from weaker societal groups, in contrast, are probably more dependent on contentious forms of preference communication. By displaying some features rather than others (or making sure that journalists pick up on these features), their protest signals will likely be better received by politicians. Our experiment dealt with the issue of asylum; the demonstrators shown in the clip and mentioned by the voiceover came across mainly as being foreign and poor. In that sense, their threat to the elected officials was not very credible or impressive. Still, we found measurable changes in representatives' beliefs after being confronted with this relatively resourcepoor segment of the public. This raises the question whether similar, maybe stronger, effects would emerge if representatives were confronted with a contentious event staged and populated by stronger societal groups, such as teachers or employers.
The fact that we found worthiness to have a positive effect on politicians' own opinions about asylum might be attributed to the fact that resource-poor individuals are required to display their deservingness, and that they can do so by behaving peacefully. Previous work on the effect of disruptiveness led to mixed results, but we found worthiness to exert a positive effect. It is not unthinkable that for other issues and other groups, or in other contexts, the effect of worthiness/disruptiveness could be different. Under a more authoritarian regime, for example, more aggressive and disruptive protests may be needed to bring the message across.
Our study contributes not only to the general field of politicians' opinion formation, but also to the more specialized field of social movements and social movement outcomes. The presence of elite allies is considered a crucial element for social movement success. Whereas most studies of protest effects treat the presence of elite allies as an exogenous factor facilitating (or constraining) protest impact, our study provides evidence that protest can shape elected officials' opinions and, as such, that movements can to some extent create the conditions for their own success. Protest can push representatives toward becoming elite allies who, in turn, are a critical resource in the political arena.
One of the major downsides of experiments is their limited external validity. We believe that the present study does rather well regarding both experimental and mundane realism. We exposed real politicians (not students) to professionally edited news items (that came across as real) about a topic they learn about primarily through the news (protest) in a realistic setting (their office, not a laboratory). The news clips were realistically designed: police archive and news media data show that asylum-seeker protests vary on the features we manipulated. The real world is, of course, far more dynamic and complex compared to the single snapshot we presented to politicians; protest actions can inspire counter movements and trigger reactions from lobbyists or other elected officials, and these signals, in turn, might reach and influence elected officials and counterbalance the protest signal. The great advantage of an experimental approach is precisely that it comes with full researcher control, is unrivaled when it comes to pinpointing causality, and allows one to isolate the effects of protest feature factors, cancelling out the noise that is omnipresent in the real world. We tested and carefully disentangled the effects of four relevant features of protest and found that they matter differently for three different relevant opinions of a large group of real elected politicians. Such a level of detail and thoroughness in establishing the exact mechanism of how protest features may lead to political outcomes is unusual. We believe the theoretical advances that can be made with experimentation largely outweigh its downsides. One may challenge the generalizability of what we found, of course; we base our conclusions on data from one country for one issue, and for one possible manipulation of WUNC. In fact, our study begs for replication on other issues, countries, and different manipulations to further refine, or contradict, what we found.
We believe that our novel experimental approach to representatives' opinion formation opens up avenues for further work on how politicians process and follow-up on public opinion signals more generally. Protest is not the only public opinion signal reaching politicians, and it would be valuable to apply similar experimental designs to signals coming from interest groups, for example. Maybe other groups' signals are processed differently and, instead of cues about the size of the population and their unity, perseverance in lobbying, their financial means, or the usefulness of the policy information they can provide might matter. Another extension would be to examine to what extent politicians' opinion formation differs from how ordinary citizens form their opinions in reaction to protest or other public opinion signals. This could tell us whether politicians are unique or react in similar ways as everyday citizens.
Our point is that the experimental approach put forward in this study has many potential extensions, and such research can speak to puzzles that are at best difficult to address with prevailing observational methods. Experiments have been on the rise in political science (Druckman et al. 2006; Iyengar 2011) , but far less so in sociology (Jackson and Cox 2013) . We believe our study shows that experimentation with elected officials is feasible and produces findings that can help us disentangle complex causal processes that are very hard to tackle in other ways.
APPenDIx

Part A. Dependent Variables Question Wording
We will now show you two television news items. These items are fictional and both deal with a demonstration on exactly the same topic. Both demonstrations developed differently and, therefore, the journalist made different news items. We would like you to watch each news item carefully. Imagine that the news items are real, and that the protest took place as shown in the item. After each item we will ask you several questions on how you personally experienced the specific protest, as depicted in the news item. If you are answering these questions on your own computer, please make sure that the audio is on and that you can listen to the news item. Click on 'next' to start the news clip.
We are interested in your personal opinion about the demonstration as shown in this first/ second news clip. Indicate on a scale from 0 to 10 to what extent you agree with the following statements.
Totally not agree Totally agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. The demonstrators in this clip attracted my interest. 2. I sympathize with the demonstrators in this clip 3. I agree with the demonstrators in this clip.
Besides your personal opinion, we are also interested in potential actions you yourself could possibly take as a result of the demonstration in this first/second news clip. 
